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Abstract: * Basic human needs* is presented as a concept of
another development in contrast to the, until recently, prevailing 
concept contred on maximizing accumulation, fixed investment, 
growth of oufput and 'modernization*. BHN does not reject 
accumulation or growth, but it rejects their enthronement 
as overriding goals over socially determined needs. The 
paper also describes historical _ antecedents and rejected 
strands of the BHN strategy. It concludes that the essence of 
BHN is about needs and mobilization of workers and peasants as 
they perceive them. The BHN strategy rests on pre-existing 
national experiences. In refining it as a global concept 
greater analysis and understanding of actual practical national 
experiences is required. BHN is a politically viable strategy 
in some places at some timesr but what the conditions of 
viability are and how they evolve over time and economic 
structural ’change is not clear. BHN should be articulated and 
promoted in specific national contexts where workers and 
peasants and their organizations/movements show interest in it.
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BASIC HUMAN NEEDS: A STRATEGIC CONCEPTUALIZATION TOWARD ANOTHER 
DEVELOPMENT
The purpose of society is man. . . to serve man there must
be a social organization of economic activities. . . conducive
to the greater production of things useful for the material 
and spiritual welfare of man. It may well be a function of 
society to organize and sustain efficient economic organizations 
and production techniques, even when. . . unpleasant and
restrictive. Production is important to the extent it 
serves man and his interests as he currently sees them.
But production is not the purpose of society. . . When
demands of "efficiency" and "production" override man's 
need for a full and good life, then society is no longer 
serving man, it is using him.
- Julius K. Nyerere
The state will not collapse because a planned quantity 
target has not been fulfilled.
- Mao Tse Tung
Development means liberation. Any action that gives (the 
people) more control of their own affairs is an action for 
development, even if it does not offer them better health 
or more bread. Any action that reduces their say in 
determining their own affairs or running their own lives 
is not development and retards them. . . it is of first
importance to place a lot of emphasis on improving (the 
people's) conditions. . . The inherited economic structure
which has kept many people out of the economic main stream 
must be replaced immediately.
- Mwongozo (Guidelines), TANU 
(Tanzania Party)
I Basic Human Needs: Stratqic Ends and Means
Basic human needs as presented in this paper is a concept of 
development. "Another development" in contrast to the 1945-1970 
concept of development centred on maximizing accumulation, 
fixed investment, growth of output and modernization.
As an organizing concept for a development strategy, basic human 
needs centres on human (primary community and individual) needs.
It gives primacy of place to moving toward the satisfaction of 
those needs as perceived by workers and peasants. It rejects 
maximizing the rate of growth of productive forces, therefore 
denying primacy to accumulation. The sacrifice of a minimum 
decent (socially determined) standard of life for workers and 
peasants, either to provide the "incentive" for capitalist 
accumulation or the means to socialist reconstruction for the 
putative benefit of rather vaguely identified future generations 
at unspecific dates, is rejected.
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BHN as a strategy turns on five broad target clusters:
(a) basic personal consumer "goods” - food, clothing, housing, 
basic furnishings, other socially defined necessities, 
whether these are "material" or not (as, for example,
a decent burial in the Chinese Six Guarantees.);
(b) universal access to basic services, e.g. primary and adult 
education, pure water, preventitive and curative health 
programmes, habitat (environmental sanitation, urban and 
rural community infrastructure), communications (in both 
senses));
(c) the right to, and reality of, productive employment 
(including self-employment) yielding both high enough 
productivity and equitable enough remuneration for each 
household with an able-bodied adult member to meet its 
basic personal consumer goods needs out of its own income;
(d) an infrastrastructure - physical, human, technical, 
institutional - capable both of producing the goods and 
services required (whether directly via home production 
or indirectly through foreign trade) and of generating 
surplus flows adequate to finance the basic communal 
services and to provide for investment to sustain increases 
in productive forces needed to advance toward BHN fulfilment;
(e) mass participation in decision-taking and review and in 
strategy formulation and control of leaders, as well as
in implementation of projects and carrying out of decisions.
BHN is production oriented. Consumption transfer payments are 
very much secondary, not central. Emphasis is on primary 
redistribution - on income, assets, power. Separation of 
production and distribution is perceived as both theoretically 
unsound and practically non-operational. The productive employment 
need is therefore both an end and a central means. Without 
higher productive forces the goods needed to meet BHN will not 
exist. Unless they are involved in production, workers and 
peasants will not have the power to enforce a BHN strategy.
Indeed a characteristic of the "model" is that each of the 
main ends is also a means. In the case of participation, 
the end centres on overcoming alienation but the critical role 
played as a means is power. Mobilization to enforce the strategy 
and mobilization to release resources not otherwise utilisable 
because their central or centralized exploitation is impracticable 
(on technical or production relations grounds) are essential 
if a BHN strategy is to survive.
Similarly the production of basic goods is a means because it 
interlocks with full employment and participatory power. The 
evident way for rural communities/peasants to meet basic food 
needs (achieve an operational right to an adequate diet) is to 
produce it themselves.
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Peasant households’ and primary communities’ ability to feed 
themselves increases their power vis a vis employers and 
bureaucrats. However, it often requires power either to 
enforce initial land reform and/or to prevent large landholder/ 
bureaucratic demobilization and diversion of peasant efforts.
The degree of reduction of inequality - and of what types of 
inequality - vital to the concept is not quite clear. For 
practical reasons relating to resource limits, as well as a 
belief that unlimited acquisition and unlimited inequality are 
wrong, ceilings as well as floors are needed. How wide the 
acceptable floor/ceiling range would be appears likely to be 
specific to country-culture-time-production relation contexts.
Total equality and the present degrees of inequality of most 
economies are limiting cases rather than likely actual targets.
BHN embodies socially determined needs - the attainment or near 
attainment of one set of specific targets would be the cause 
for another, not for a feeling of arrival. Exclusion;inequality, 
comparative (not only absolute) poverty, are the basic'' targets .'
This is a major divide from the "minimum material needs" school.
It is to date obscured by the lack even of a hypothetical 
detailed BHN trajectory for a middle or high level of productive 
forces polity/economy (e.g. Mexico, Singapore, Sweden).
t
BHN is not - either in principle, in the conceptual formulations 
nor in the national praxes drawn upon - limited to material 
needs. A decent burial has little to do with production; 
universal adult education including consciousness raising is 
neither easily fed into a growth model nor self evidently 
politically stabilizing. The employment goal, at least to some 
proponents, rests on a belief that creative activity includes 
work and is not limited to leisure (and especially not 
"enforced leisure"]). Non-material goals pose difficulties in 
general presentations - quantitative parameters for participation 
are yet to be devised in any serious sense, the particular 
non-material needs of any society/class are unlikely to be 
plausibly aggregated at a global level except in terms of 
platitudes or of input costs.
Therefore BHN interacts positively and integrally with human 
rights in a way growth, modernization and accumulation maximization 
does not. Socially determined needs (of human beings individually 
and collectively) lead to rights to pursue and obligations to 
act in support of those•needs.
BHN may offer a route to transcending the sterile dichotomy 
between "traditional" ("negative", "low cost", "individual") 
human rights freedom from torture - and "broader" ("positive"), 
"high cost", collective human rights - e.g. right to eat.
The division at present obfuscates and obscures. The right 
not to starve is surely individual as well as collective.
It can be stated negatively. In India (or Chile) with an 
overall food surplus it is arguable that fulfilling it would 
have a low real resource cost. The right to communicate is 
surely communal class and collective as well as individual.
It is a positive formulation of "freedom" from censorship".
The cost even in direct real resource terms (and much more 
in power and thus resource allocation impact) is far from 
negligible.
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Human beings are human as individuals within a context of 
social relationships. Any need or right has both communal 
and individual aspects. Postive/negative is largely a matter 
of formulation. Cost is very much in the eye of the beholder 
or pocket of the payer. The traditional human rights add up 
to "freedom from repression.** To argue that they cost no real 
resources is to abstract from political economic reality. In 
Chile the cost of assured freedom from repression for workers, 
peasants, trade unions, peasant associations, the church would 
be total. To .tell a regime or a class that its own demise is 
costless is a way to mystify the speaker not to convince the 
auditor.
BHN/human rights interaction has not been thoroughly examined.
What dialogue there has been has tended to be in the context 
of basic material or minimum consumption needs strategies. Their 
failure to encompass the whole body of human rights (traditional 
or socio-economic) is clear enough, but so too is their 
inadequacy as a strategic embodiment of BHN.
The global inequality implications of BHN have usually been 
glossed over or set aside - particularly in papers emanating 
from international organizations - because they are so strikingly 
at variance with the status quo and with any plausible trajectory. 
Further many of the national experiences drawn upon have been 
operated rather separately from the international economic 
strategies of the states concerned. The international strategies 
of states committed to BHN domestically have concentrated on 
selective delinking (or more positibely, national economic 
integration), exploitation of specific possibilities for marginal 
gains in the present international economic context, participation 
in NIEO type coalitions of states formed along international 
distribution of surplus (not national inter-personal or 
inter-class distribution) lines.
II BHN, Accumulation, Growth
BHN does not reject accumulation or growth. What it rejects 
is their enthronment as overriding goals. At one level this 
is simple realism. No set of national decision takers - capitalist 
or socialist - has ever literally viewed maximum growth or 
accumulation as a key goal. Certainly none has been indifferent; 
to who controlled accumulation, what in particular was produced, 
how it was produced and distributed, who got how much. The 
maximum growth of GDP model always was a rather abstracted 
clerk's view of decision taking, not a worker^, a peasant's, a 
manager’s, a bureaucrat’s or a politician's.
However, the BHN strategic conceptualization goes further than 
this. It views GDP as an inadequate measure of human welfare 
because human nature is not such that full humanity can be 
achieved simply through material goods and services. Further 
BHN places a high priority on progress toward meeting the basic 
human needs of workers and peasants - especially those in 
absolute poverty - more fully today and on setting in motion 
a steady movement upward in BHN satisfaction even if this 
does reduce present growth and the possible consumption of 
future generations.
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"Man does not live by bread alone" is a postion consistent 
with a BHN strategy. Among the things needed is bread and the 
means to make it available more abundantly to more people. 
Therefore, in low or medium productive force level countries 
BHN does include growth - of particular goods and services, in 
particular ways for particular classes, communities, persons 
- as a crucial means.
In fact, many BHN national practitioners would contend that 
concentration on basic needs will increase, not decrease, growth. 
The empirical evidence does not refute them. There is no 
relation between inequality and savings or growth. While there 
is a statistical relation between investment and growth it is 
not a very close one. In many countries small farms yield more 
per acre than large and utilize surplus more efficiently in 
building up agricultural potential. Changing production relations 
and beneficiaries (as in some land reforms) can unlock productive 
forces previously unusable. Therefore, it seems unreasonable 
to argue that a BHN strategy would be likely to cause a radical 
decline in output growth overall or would be unable to sustain 
a more rapid growth of goods and services critical to meeting 
BHN goals.
The case of overdeveloped countries would be different. Change 
is clearly needed for transition to BHN. Equally the gaps - in 
participation, equality, productive employment, access to 
basic services and for not unconsiderable numbers, basic personal 
consumption - between reality and even approximate BHN fulfilment 
are large. Whether these can be bridged at present total output 
per capita levels by altering production and distribution has 
both political and time dimensions.
Politically imposing ceilings is easier if these do not require 
absolute reductions for large numbers. Therefore, while growth 
alone will never achieve transition, it may make it easier, even 
in economies with high initial levels of achieved productive 
forces per capita.
A failed growth strategy - what one has had in rich capitalist 
countries since 1974 - is not an acceptablexNstable state/;and in 
practice moves away from BHN. A transition to BHN at stable 
overall non renewable resource use and physical output levels 
must be planned and phased. Therefore, it may be that interim 
recovery to 4-5% growth in OECD economies is needed to allow 
the beginning of transition to "another development". To 
date no serious BHN articulation for a rich country exists - 
the^stable state'and ecology models are not articulated* do 
not face equality (or political power) issues squarely and have 
little worker or peasant support or appeal as now formulated.
Even in their progressive forms,they are upper middle class 
intellectual consxructs of a return to a neo-Arcadia that 
never was; in the "limits to growth" variants they are objectively 
"what we have we hold" rationalizations.
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III Historical Antecedents; Intellectual and Operational
Basic Human Needs as a concept was not invented in a vacuum by 
the technical paper writers and consultants for the ILO's 
World Emplpyment Conference, even though that Conference was 
one of the first occasions at which the concept was discussed 
in its present terminology in a major forum. Like any other 
concept, it represents reordering existing elements in a new 
pattern as well as adding newer ones. Main strands influencing 
the emergence of BHN strategic or strategic component conceptuali­
zation included:
1- The Indian (e.g. K. N. Rajj B. Minhas) basic and minimum 
• ’needs work of the 1960's, including the studies of differences 
in needs fulfillment not directly correlated to average 
levels of productive forcesrand of attempts ‘to'design 
state action packages to enable communities to meet these 
needs as a central aspect in development strategy, plus 
related South Asian studies (e.g. those of K. Griffin,
A. Rahman, P. Wignaraja).
2. The attempt to articulate an economic and pricing calculus 
more relevant to a socialist society's aims (associated 
with Kalecki and I. Sachs), i.e. what Minhas has termed 
the rejection of the Benthamite expansion of neo-classical 
marginalist economics into a general social model.
3. The "mass needs" debate, particularly in its Mahgrebin Egyptian 
form aspects centred on examining the limits 6'f socio-economic
reconstruction under Nasser and of those imposed by the 
initial (de Bernis) heavy industry centred Algerian 
strategy.
4. The Latin American thinking flowing from perceptions of 
the limitations and failures as well as insights of the 
basic ECLA "gapmanship" model (e.g. E. Cardoso) and the 
disaggregation of the dependence models to study detailed 
impacts on exploited and excluded groups as a foundation 
for constructing dynamic formulations (e.g. R. Stavenhagen,
C. Furtado).
5. The interaction orcontradition of the New International 
Economic Order dialogue with that of Self-Reliance.
Especially relevant was the perceived inadequacy of changes 
at international level without parallel or prior 
national strategic changes. In their absence, while 
interterritorial gain divisions might be'altered, the 
excluded, exploited and oppressed in the periphery would
be unlikely to be the principal beneficiaries.
6. The reaction against arguments based on Limits to Growth 
that world resource constraints required continued inequality 
(or even the asceptic genocide advocated by the "triage" 
theorists) and in particular the work of the Bariloche 
Foundation in creating a Latin American model to demonstrate 
the feasibility of meeting basic material needs in a
brief time period if that goal were to receive top priority.
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7. The attempt by the United Nations Environment Programme 
(and particularly by Maurice Strong) to develop an 
"inner limit" of minimum human needs as a co-constraint 
with the ecological "outer limit" in the development
of environmental policy.
8. The World Bank's (and particularly Robert McNamara's) 
growing concern from 1969 on that the old development 
model excluded at least 40% of the World's population 
from its benefits, a concern leading to the "absolute 
poverty eradication" and "redistribution with growth" 
themes in IBRD with their associated thinking, speeches, 
analysis and - more modestly - programming.
9. The International Labour Organization!s World Employment 
Programme, and the conversion of those most involved in 
it from a wage employment to a working poor, full 
productive employment (including self employment), 
equitable distribution focus.
10. A general revolt - especially by periphery paricipants
but not limited to them - against intellectual overcentralism. 
One branch was a "revolt of the periphery" against 
Eiiropentric intellectual paradigms, another a questioning 
of top down analysis which related only to central decision 
takers' and associated intellectuals' perceptions of 
reality, a third a rejection of economistic reductionism.
11. The experience of several nations which did pursue 
strategies markedly unlike that of the old paradigm.
China, Tanzania were central for the BHN advocates,
Taiwan, South Korea for the more conservative Basic 
Needs, (or minimum needs) modellers. Sri-Lanka has 
been a source of fascination but doubt for both, because 
its basic needs approach was largely non-participatory, 
curiously random intellectually, only peripherally linked 
to primary (as opposed to secondary fiscal and subsidy) 
redistribution and neither economically not socially 
self-sustaining. These experiences were felt partly
as experienced or observed by the other analysts. Like 
any such use the elements selected were not the whole 
of national experience and, on occasion, may have been 
based on misperceptions.
Of these influences, the last - actual practice - was, and 
is, probably the most important' intellectually, and certainly 
operationally. However, the UNEP-IBRD-ILO strands occasioned 
much of the particular analysis and writing leading to the present 
form of the BHN dialogue. Because national terminologies are 
quite diverse whereas the international organizations/associated 
intellectual terminology is, or appeared to be, "stranded", 
the debate appears more international, European and global 
organization centred than it is. Tanzania, for example, has 
a complex ongoing dialogue on the nature and trajectory of its 
BHN strategy but largely in Swahili and, even when in English, 
using different terminolgy.
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Rejected Strands
Three influences, often asserted to have been critical, almost 
certainly have not been (whether for better or for worse).
Indeed, they were positively rejected by a majority of those 
involved in the early stages of the dialogue:
a) the old European late colonial export model "community 
development" movement of the 1950s-60s, an approach 
seen as offending both against freedom (paternalism and 
Eurocentrism) and necessity (inadequate attention to the 
basic need of poor people’to produce more);
b) tine social statistics movement - including "social cost/' 
benefit" analysis. This has been seen as usually economistic, 
always in danger of "black boxing" experts' value judgements 
as objective truth and usually ignoring needs as perceived
by workers and peasants. ,:In fact measuring poverty in 
detail can often be a substitute for, or an. excuse for 
not, acting in.respect o'f perfectly visible needs.
c) the more austere "alternative life style", "minimum 
throughput", "zero growth" forms of First World Environmentalism. 
They are seen in the Third World as relating to totally 
different objective conditions and as embodying some values 
(e.g., austerity for its own sake) the Third World and
Third World oriented participants do not share.
A tension or a rejection is an influence. In that sense the 
foregoing trio were influences, but not in the more usual 
sense of having been accepted models.
IV Basic Human Needs and its Asserted Kinsmen
Before looking at variants of BHN as a strategic approach 
three self asserted kinsmen require mention:
1. "Minimum material needs" ("absolute poverty eradication") 
is an approach to limiting potential explosive pressures 
from .the excluded; a means to satisfying conscience by 
technically programmed, means tested global charity; 
and/or a modern statement of the Ricardian-Marxian 
condition for maximum sustainable exploitation in the 
service of rapid and sustainable expanded reproduction.
One variant is Nobel Laureate Friedman's negative income 
tax for a guaranteed minimum income, not that practicing 
Friedmaniacs ‘ seem to set much store by that device.
2. Technocratic "basic needs" models assume that the problems 
are largely management gaps within the elite decision taking 
groups interacting with lack of ability to grasp opportunities 
by "the poor". These may go beyond "minimum material needs" 
in a production/distribution sense but only on a "welfare 
state" basis. Politically they are naive: elite decision 
takers do not develop management for meeting basic needs 
because they perceive them as opposed to their (personal
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and subclass) interests rather more than because they are 
unable to understand what is proposed. Workers and 
peasants lack power to enforce strategy on decision takers 
not sa'Wach because they lack consciousness to perceive 
that its elements can - in an altered context - serve 
them, but from an inability to break the repressive 
forces sustaining the existing context.
3. Social democratic "basic heeds" models (e.g. Redistribution 
With Growth in its more radical moments) do begin to grapple 
with asset and power distribution but in a rather hesitant, 
incremental and individual case manner quite atypical 
of serious political economic paradigms or historic 
political economic structural transformations. This is 
true even of the more radical models - e.g. Bariloche - 
if they are conceived of as proto-plans rather than
as destructive polemics against the presenx paradigm.
Asset, institutional, income distribution, class power 
and state role elements are not built into these models.
Their initial assumptions do not make clear what is 
assumed about these critical variables. The most rigorous 
reading of such models might be that of a call for "global 
Fabianism" (i.e. the ultimate strategic victory over revolution 
to be won by a series of planned tactical defeats on 
specific reform measures). That is unworkable vide 
Sri Lanka and Jamaica as national cases of the limits 
and costs of a BN by consumption transfers approach and 
actual'global resource transfer levels as a comment on 
the international "welfare system's" inadequacy.
"Not everyone who saith Lord, Lord shall enter into the Kingdom 
of Heaven" and not everyone who says "Basic Needs, Basic Needs" 
supports the strategic conceptualization set out in this paper.
The Roman emperors provided "bread and circuses" for the 
masses. Authoritiarian regimes present "basic needs" programmes 
which seem modern variants, say "football stadia and black 
beans", "basketball courts and rice". Basic needs defined 
in material terms, delivered by a bureaucracy and planned by 
an elite can create client groups, demobilize mass groups, 
create new patterns of dependence. Brazil's public services 
programmes are an example as, from some points of view, is 
South Korea's relatively equal but highly regulated and outside 
programmed peasant sector.
V BHN and NIEO: Contradiction or Complementarity
BHN has been attacked as an attempt to deflect attention from 
the necessity of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
and advocated as the New National Economic Order base without 
which NIEO is probably unattainable and, even to the extent 
achieved, likely to reinforce national and transnational 
hieracrchies and hegemonies even if it redistributes power 
among them. Equally NIEO has been denounced as an elite power 
game rooted in the growth, modernization, accumulation paradigm, 
and therefore inimical to BHN and advocated as offering a 
minimally just and equitable framework within which societies/ 
states committed to BHN could more safely and easily pursue 
national and collective strategies and programmes. Part of the 
conflict is real, part is ambiguous, part results from lack of
clarity as to what the participants perceive BHN, NIEO, NNEO, self reliance as being and encompassing.
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Inherently BHN is consistent with - indeed a logical national 
base for - the NIEO embodied in the Charter of the Economic 
Rights and Duties of States. It is, however, probably inconsistent 
with the TNC led global integration model underlying the RIO 
Report. The minimum material and basic needs variants may 
well be purveyed as alternatives to NIEO. To do so in respect 
of BHN is hardly plausible given its emphasis on relative as 
well as absolute deprivation and ceilings as well as floors.
In the ILO/World Employment Programme context, a relatively full 
blooded BN approach has tended to attract progressive backing 
and a combination of lip service and critical comment from 
defenders of the status quo - not necessarily on strict 
North/South lines. In the UNCTAD context, attempts toy 
Group B (capitalist industrilized economies) to raise basic/ 
minimal/material needs issues have been challenged (not least 
by South BHN advocates) as deliberate divisive or diversive 
tactics. This is evidently correct in many negotiating contexts, 
e.g. a hard fibres agreement may be critical for NIEO (and for 
BHN in Mozambique and Tanzania); to assert that Brazil and 
Kenya (and perhaps India) do not place adequate stress on 
meeting minimum needs is either an irrelevance or a not very 
subtle effort to divide and rule. The latter interpretation 
is strengthened when Mozambican and Tanzanian BHN policies are 
criticized by the same states in other forums, indeed are 
contrasted unfavourably to "devil take the hindmost" type 
"competitive" incentive centred strategies in Brazil and Kenya!
The BHN critique of NIEO - particularly at the Manila UNCTAD - 
is based on a perception (which may be correct) that the 
majority of the 77 are interested in redistribution internationally 
more to prevent than to facilitate basic socio-economic- power 
structure changes nationally. To the extent that the means 
of redistribution sought include dependent integration - almost 
certainly integrally and inherently inconsistent with BHN - 
a real contradiction exists. Otherwise two counter arguments 
can be made. First, international redistribution tends to 
make any national or collective Third World strategy easier to 
pursue - including BHN. Second, more resources (and even more 
intensive dependent integration) do not self evidently bolster 
repressive, hierarchical, elitist politics (capitalist or other). 
Certainly OPEC did not save the Shah (nor destroy the Algerian 
revolution) and there is little reason to suppose the 1979 price 
increases wi-ii save the "Irn^m" Khomeni (or weaken progressive 
efforts to achieve social democracy in Venezuela and Ecuador).
BHN's International Economic Model
Neither the Old International Economic Order (now about a decade 
in its grave) nor the virulent New International Economic 
Disorder are contexts conducive to achieving BHN strategies.
More equity, more resources, more participation, more room to 
manoeuvre internationally are clearly not sufficient conditions 
for BHN nationally. Nor are they always necessary conditions.
But they are likely to be facilitating conditions for the 
success of BHN strategies in poor, peripheral economies and 
polities.
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As the group of economic advisers to the World Council of Churches 
Commission on the Churches' Participation in Development put it 
at their 1979 Oaxtepec meeting:
it is not possible to consider the two spheres independently. 
The internationalization of capital and production, 
the expansion of the transnational corporations, the 
reinforcing of bilateralism and protactionism are only 
a few of the factors which are now remodelling international 
relations and imposing styles of development more connected 
to the needs of these relationships than to those of 
the respective peoples. The urgency of action toward the 
establishment of a NIEO is critical to national economic 
restructuring.
Similarly a commitment to BHN has definite implications for 
types of international economic relations sought. This is 
likely to be particularly true (as argued by Oteiza, Rahman,
Flotto and others) in respect of South/South collective self 
reliance initiatives. If this perception is correct^ it poses 
two problems and offers two potential advantages.
First, commitment to BHN is not conveniently clustered in 
adjacent states. That raises problems in articulating regional 
economic coordination which, on other grounds, is one of the 
more promising avenues of South/South interaction. Even the 
most progressive of the regional bodies - the.Andean Pact - 
can hardly be described as a BHN venture; albeit, unlike laissez 
faire common markets, it has the potential to be supportive 
of national BHN commitments. Second, not all useful South/South 
bodies require a broad range of common national interests; OPEC 
is an obvious example. To test all coordination efforts soley 
on direct BHN promotion criteria would tend to obscurantism or 
mystification serving the status quo.
On the other hand, because BHN is rooted at the levels of 
production and distribution - not exchange - it should help 
overcome the faulty emphasis on exchange as an end in itself 
which has bedevilled economic cooperation theory and practice 
in the Third World. National and European integration has been 
based on production (validated by exchange) and its contradictions 
rooted in distribution (symptomized by exchange). Common 
market theory appears on reflection to have chosen the worst 
possible starting point for understanding or influencing the 
process (a mistake"the great integrationist writers such as 
Liszt, Hamilton, Smith, Ricardo and Marx notably did not make).
Further, a BHN focus would concentrate South/South cooperation 
on concrete mutual interests more effectively pursued in common 
and probably on ones less dependent on TNC knowledge and physical 
products than either imitations of the EEC or "labour intensive, 
export led growth through integration" models. To quote 
Chairman Quett Masire of the Southern Africa Development 
Coordination Conference (sponsored by the Front Line States):
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The Front Line States will identify areas in which, 
working in harmony, we can gear national development to 
provide goods and services presently coming from the 
Republic of South Africa and thereby weave a fabric 
of regional cooperation and development. . . We must ensure
that the efforts of our people to achieve development, 
to meet their basic human needs, are in a setting 
which gives them the greatest chance of success. That 
setting is Southern African regional development 
coordination.
VI Problems. Possibilities, Potential
A conceptual frame and strategic focus for "another development" 
is needed. The old growth and modernisation paradigm is almost dead 
intellecturally, and most of its operational supporters use it in 
the absence of an alternative, not from conviction. The last 
unreconstructed growthmen seem to be the official political 
economists of the Soviet Union.
Unless one is willing to accept a technocratic development 
paradigm centred on efficiency defined in physical output, 
distribution defined by a capitalist or a socialist corporate 
state, organisation defined in terms of hierarchical pyramids 
of "expertise" and participation defined as isolated individuals 
implementing directives from, and receiving benefits through, 
externally controlled institutions, then a concept and strategy 
akin to BHN are needed. This is not to argue that BHN as 
presently presented or understood is adequate.
First the concepts are still somewhat vague. This does not create 
a case for statistical poverty mapping at global levels as a 
way to elaborate BHN theory. BHN if it is anything is contextual 
nationally and pluralist in embodiment globally. Detailed, 
uniform physical targets at global level would deny that reality. 
Further - whether intentionally or not - they drain out the 
conflict of interest, struggle, production relations, class and 
equity elements which are at the core of actual national BHN 
efforts whether by Chairman Mao and Premier Chao, Mwalimu Nyerere, 
the late President Boumedienne, Prime Minister Manley or 
the late Minister Pereira. They do not clarify,but mystify; 
they do not mobilize,but manipulate.
Indeed the next steps in refining the general global concept, 
should be greater analysis of actual, partial national experiences 
and articulation of coherent potential scenarios for states 
- e.g. Sweden, Poland, - Jamaica, Venezuela, Namibia - whose 
decision takers, workers and peasants, show some real interest 
in a BHN alternative. Only with that data and experience can 
the genexa.1 theoretical framework be made more consistent, 
relevant and intellectually rigorous.
Second, technical feasibility conditions have not been studied 
carefully either in general or in the states pursuing a BHN 
variant. One need not endorse a straight line growth path nor
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deny that participation results in mistakes as well as successes 
to suggest that some of the details of Tanzania1s villageization 
strategy or of China's cultural revolution - or least from 
1972 on - were unnecessarily wasteful and damaging in BHN 
terms.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate that BHN strategies can make 
progress toward each of the main five goals and toward all at 
once. Defining limits, conditions, comulative interaction, 
substituti'on among goals is much harder. In one sense it depends 
on context. For example, what is possible in China with a 
3,000 year tradition and an equally long^ albeit often interrupted 
experience of a strong central state with an efficient, merit 
selected, decentralized bureaucracy is not possible in a much 
newer nation with a weak and short public service tradition and 
experience (and that a very centralised one) like Tanzania.
What could be done by transforming production and redistributing 
existing capacity to earn income by changing production relations 
in a rich economy like Sweden is- very different from what may 
be possible in a middle level of productive forces one like 
Namibia or a very poor one like Mozambique. Or as Amilcar Cabral 
of Guinea Bissau put it:
Our own reality - however fine and attractive the reality 
of others may be - can only be transformed by detailed 
knowledge of it, by our own efforts, by our own sacrifices. .
Again serious study as to what technical., policy and resource 
possibilities limits are in actual national contexts is the., 
precondition for more detailed general articulation and conclusions 
Importing efficiency analysis from growth models will be useful 
only to a limited extent and in other cases may be positively 
harmful. Efficiency is dependent on goals - e.g. if one 
agricultural technology maximizes incomes of rich peasants and 
marketed surplus while another maximize^ poor peasant income 
and food consumption,the real choice between them is on 
political, class and power values not on which shows a slightly 
higher rate of growth of total marketed and producer consumed 
output.
Third, political practicability and requirements are still very 
vaguely understood. Too many economists among the conceptualizers 
and too many international organizations who seek to take 
the politics out of political economy and political choice to 
avoid discord or conflict have achieved that. Fairly clearly 
a complete, violent revolution is neither necessary to embark 
on a BHN strategy (e.g. Tanzania), sufficient to guarantee 
one (e.g. Kampuchea), nor adequate to spell out the course of 
non-violent struggle once power has been secured (e.g. China).
On the other hand, to seek to create BHN villages in a growth 
and modernization national economy or to create a subordinated 
BHN sector in parallel with a dominant capitalist one is unlikely 
to succeed in doing more than offering some social welfare unless 
there is a byproduct of increased open contrast and contradiction 
and of worker and peasant mobilisation leading to a broader 
revolutionary change (whether violent or otherwise).
-  15 -
Study at national level has been hampered by secrecy and public 
relations style optimism in official.work, somewhat naive initial 
enthusiasm by sympathetic outside observers and apocalyptic 
criticism by other outside analysts who measure only the gap 
between goals and present realities without serious historical 
or dialectical study of trends and trajectories. This has costs 
to analysts and, more important, to national strategy implementa­
tion.- In Tanzania the caution - e.g. in the 1964-76 reduction 
of the proto-capi'tal'ist farmer power base in relation to local 
officials and through cooperatives - used to avoid high levels 
of open class struggle clearly limited the ability to mobilize 
workers and peasants and also the speed with which resources . 
could be redeployed toward BHN. On the other hand, in China 
after 1965, the levels and nature of political struggle - and 
especially their duration - would appear to have been not only 
unnecessary but counterproductive either for fulfilling the 
Six Guarantees or broadening the worker/peasant base. Such 
questions do merit serious analysis by participants and by outsiders.
Fairly clearly BHN - at least in part - is a politically viable 
strategy in some places at some times. Even post-Mao China 
has a strategy much more influenced by BHN tl^ an by orthodox .
Soviet growthmanship. Tanzania's Party held on to the BHN 
aspects of policy over the 1974-77 crisis at the known risk 
of national economic collapse either because it believed 
traditional economic salvation was as bad as collapse and/or 
because, it perceived a retreat to inegalitarian growthmanship 
as political suicide. But what the conditions - both necessary 
and sufficient - are and how they evolve, over time and economic 
structural change is not at all clear.
The full BHN strategy is one of struggle and not an easy unity 
of interests. It centres on a class and community based inter­
pretation of human society not on an isolated individual one.
In that respect it is in the Marxist and the revolutionary 
traditions.
On the other hand, the stress on present welfare of the excluded, 
exploited and oppressed and the dethronement of accumulation 
and growth from primacy among goals is anti-economistic in a 
way as challenging to Marxist as to Bourgeois economic orthodoxy.
This challenge within the BHN strategy is not a romantic one
- quite clear political, technical and economic thought and action 
are spelled out. Neither China nor Tanzania, Algeria nor 
Vietnam is a soft state. The African poet David Diop's 
reflection is appropriate to the formulation and achievement 
of BHN strategies:
That tree grows
There splendidly alone. . .
Is Africa, your Africa. It puts forth new shoots
With patience and stubborness puts forth new shoots
Slowly its fruits grow to have
The harsh, strong taste of liberty.
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Basic Human Needs is a conceptual advance toward understanding 
what Another Development would be and identifying the strategic 
tools for moving toward it. Ultimately it rests on pre-existing 
national experiences - in all of which politics not technical 
expertise, goal achievement not abstract "efficiency" is 
in command - and on their ability to survive, develop and be 
joined by others. Conceptualization can help as can identifying 
technical and political degrees of freedom and necessity but 
only in a secondary way. If BHN is about anything it is about
the needs and mobilization of workers and peasants as they perceive
them, certainly not about creating a playground for technocratic 
model builders or a new utopia for managerial, academic or 
bureaucratic Platonic Guardians. President Nyerere's Keynote 
Speech to the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development sums up the danger and the need:
If the people are to develop;, they must have power.
They must be able to control their own activities 
within the framework of their village communities.
. . . At present the best intentioned governments
- my own included - too readily move from a conviction of 
the need for rural development into acting as if the 
people had no ideas of their own. This is quite wrong.
. . . people do know what their basic needs are. . . .
if they have sufficient freedom they can be relied upon 
to determine their own priorities of development.
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